|1Hobova, Ye. |
1A. Yu. Krymskyi Institute of Oriental Studies, NAS of Ukraine. 4, Hrushevskoho Str., Kyiv, 01001, Ukraine
|Kitaêznavčì doslìdžennâ 2020, 1:5–16|
|Section: Political, social and economic development of China|
Coronavirus epidemic that started in late 2019 in Wuhan, became an unprecedented challenge for the Chinese healthcare system and Chinese diplomacy. The paper analyses the measures and claims made by official China from the point of the crisis communication theory. Crisis management strategies and actions in the public infosphere of China during the initial stage of new coronavirus pneumonia spread within the country. Using the written texts of MFA of PRC press conferences and news messages in the key official information agencies, the main narratives of internal and external communication are examined. The analysis highlights flaws on the stage of initial response to the crisis – untimely reaction, uncoordinated measures, lack of empathic messages. All of that may lead to complications in reputation repair and further increase of China’s reputational burden in the context of healthcare crises. Content of the narratives found in the material, despite the shortcomings in the communication of Wuhan epidemic, shows the current trends in Chinese foreign relations. Proactive formation of a “responsible great state” image is one of the most prominent traits in the MFA speakers’ rhetoric. Internal crisis communication had consistent promotion of information on personal safety measures and hygiene recommendations for the epidemic. Such a strategy combined with the general narrative of “people’s battle with the disease” helped at least in part to reduce panic within the society. Epidemic in the foreign media also became a part of the general epidemic discourse in the Chinese traditional media. References to current foreign relations concepts, accurate action coordination with the Chinese information agencies, in particular, showed overall preparedness of the country’s official representatives to this kind of situation. In general, taking into account the discovered shortcomings, the stage of initial response to the crisis exhibited satisfactory actions of corresponding institutions and efficiency of international relations concepts that were guiding these actions.
|Keywords: China, COVID-19, crisis communication, foreign affairs, narrative|
- Benoit, W. L. (1995), Accounts, excuses, and apologies: A theory of image restoration, State University of New York Press, Albany, NY.
- Cinelli, M., Quattrociocchi, W., Galeazzi, A., Valensise, C. M., Brugnoli, E. et al (2020), The COVID-19 Social Media Infodemic, available at: https://ui.adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2020arXiv200305004C/abstract
- Coombs, W. T. & Holladay, S. J. (2006), “Halo or reputational capital: Reputation and crisis management”, Journal of Communication Management, 10(2), рр. 123–37. https://doi.org/10.1108/13632540610664698
- Coombs, W. T. (2004), “Impact of past crises on current crisis communications: Insights from situational crisis communication theory”, Journal of Business Communication, 41, рр. 265–89. https://doi.org/10.1177/0021943604265607
- Coombs, W. T. (2007), Ongoing crisis communication: Planning, Managing, and responding (2nd ed.), Sage, Los Angeles, CA.
- Gao Xiangze (2007), “Responsibility Theory: Necessary Resort of the Ethics of Contemporary Society”, Journal of Changsha University of Science and Technology.
- Stojanovic, D. (2020), China’s ‘mask diplomacy’ wins support in Eastern Europe, available at: https://apnews.com/76dff4b113e82d85716262895909f151
- Triwibowo, A. (2020), Diplomacy and COVID-19: a reflection, available at: http://journal.unpar.ac.id/index.php/JurnalIlmiahHubunganInternasiona/ar...
- Verma R. (2020), “China’s ‘mask diplomacy’ to change the COVID-19 narrative in Europe”, Asia Europe Journal, рр. 1–5. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-020-00576-1
- Waijiaobu (2020a), 2020 nian 1 yue 23 ri waijiaobu fayanren Geng Shuang zhuchi liexing jizhehui, available at: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/t1735570.shtml
- Waijiaobu (2020b), 2020 nian 2 yue 3 ri waijiaobu fayanren Hua Chunyingzhuchi wangshang liexing jizhehui, available at: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/t1739521.shtml
- Waijiaobu (2020c), 2020 nian 3 yue 12 ri waijiaobu fayanren Geng Shuang zhuchi liexing jizhehui, available at: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/t1755063.shtml
- Du Chengmin (2020), Aoman yu pianjian bi bingdu geng du, LEIFENG, 5 yue hao, 84–88 ye.
- Han Dandan (2020), Kangji yiqing – zhanxian Zhongguo liliang, Daqing shehui kexue, di 2 qi, 30–33 ye.
- Han Ruibo, Wang Yaru (2020), Gonggong weiji guanli yanjiu jinzhan yu yiqing xiade Shijian daoxiang, Xuexi luntan, 2020 nian, 6 yue, di 6 qi, 62–70 ye.
- He Liang (2019), Tisheng xin shidai Zhongguo guoji huayuquan, available at: http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/hqwg/2019-09/09/c_1124968280.htm
- Hu Rui (2020), Yiqing fangzhi zhong shequ zeren de guoji jingyan jiejian, Beijing chengshi xueyuan xuebao, di 2 qi, 1–4 ye.
- Luo Yedan (2020), Yiqing fangkong guoji huayuquan de lilun sikao. Renmin luntan, 4 yue-5yue hebing chuban, 146–47 ye.
- Men Honghua (2016), Goujian xinxing guoji guanxi: Zhongguo de zeren yue dandang, Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi, di 3 qi, 4–25 ye.
- Ouyang Hui (2019), Xi Jinping xiang shijie jiang hao Zhongguo gushi de si-xiang, available at: http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2019/0222/c40531-30897581.html
- Qiao Xinsheng (2020), Zhongda yiqing yu xifang meiti de baodao, Qingnian jizhe, 2020, 4 yue xia, 109 ye.
- Sun Jisheng (2020), Lilun, jizhi, nengli: jiaqiang Zhongguo waijiao yanjiu de sikao, Taipingyang xuebao, di 5 qi, 1–13 ye.
- Wan Peng (2018), Xi Jinping tichu “renlei mingyun gongtongti” zhongda yiyi zhi san: Zhongguo gongxian fanrong shijie, available at: http://cpc.people.com.cn/xuexi/n1/2018/0126/c385474-29787976.html
- Wang Yiwei (2020a), Zuo hao yiqing gonggong waijiao, goujian renlei mingyun gongtongti, Gonggong waijiao jikan, di 1 qi, 17–27 ye.
- Wang Yiwei (2020b), Zhongguo zhanxian fuzeren daguo xingxiang, Renmin luntan, 4 yue – 5 yue hebing chuban, 36–39 ye.
- Wang Zhongyun (2020), Yiqing xinchangtai xia de “youxiao yufang” yu “guoji hezuo”, Xinmin zhoukan, di 1090 qi, 50–51 ye.
- Xi Jinping (2015), Daguo yiweizhe geng da zeren, er fene geng da longduan, available at: http://world.people.com.cn/n/2015/0328/c157278-26764197.html
- Xi Jinping (2019), Zhangxian Zhongguo fuzeren daguo dandang: guoji renshi reyi Xi Jinping zhuxi xinnian heci, Renmin ribao, 1 yue 2 ri.
- Jian Jiwang (2020), Wuhan feiyan hui chuanran: huanzhe yi zhuanru jinyintan yuyuan, ba wen Wuhan bingduxing feiyan, available at: https://www.xianjichina.com/special/detail_438105.html
- Yan Yan, Wen Jing (2020), Xinguan yiqing zaoqi de meijie shiyong, fengxian ganzhi yu geti xingwei, Xinwen jie, di 6 qi, 50–61 ye.
- Ye Hao (2012), Gonggong waijiao yu guoji chuanbo, Xiandai chuanbo, di 6 qi, 11–19 ye.
- Ye Xiaowen (2020), Fangzhi Zhonghua minzu fuxing jincheng zhong de dianfuxing fengxian, Kaifang daobao, di 3 qi, 7–13 ye.
- Zheng Yanfang (2020), Huayu shengtai chuanbo shijiao xia chengxiang “fangyi” xuanchuan yu yanjiu, Chuanmei guancha, di 6 qi, 33–40 ye.
- Zhongguo xinwen wang (2020), Zhongguo zhan “yi”: ba ge guanjianci beihou de fali yiju, available at: http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2020/01-30/9073283.shtml