1Kiktenko, V
1A. Yu. Krymskyi Institute of Oriental Studies, NAS of Ukraine. 4, Hrushevskoho Str., Kyiv, 01001, Ukraine
Kitaêznavčì doslìdžennâ 2021, 1:56-67
Section: Political, Social and Economic Development of China
Language: Ukrainian

The article examines the Three Represents theory of the Communist Party of China as an important stage in the development of Sinified Marxism, analyzes the historical background of its formation, its practical goals and main provisions, theoretical connection with Marxism- Leninism, as well as the ideas of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping theory. It is noted that the need to introduce a new theory was due to the necessity to overcome ideological and political fragmentation, which negatively affected the legitimacy of the central government. It is shown that the Three Represents does not rely on the revolutionary history of the CPC and ideological dogmas, but offers a response to new challenges. Furthermore, it was determined that the Three Represents as a whole was aimed at the all-around development of the socialist economy, politics, culture, and society with Chinese characteristics, and this, at its core, should correspond to the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of Chinese citizens. It is noted that such an ideological discourse is not characteristic of socialist construction, and this should be understood as a significant change in the orientation of the CPC – from the “vanguard of the working class” to the “nationwide party”. The process of incorporating neo-conservatism into Marxism-Leninism in the theory of the Three Represents is analyzed, which manifested itself in a pragmatic orientation towards economic growth, Chinese culture, promoting the interests of the majority of Chinese citizens and transforming the CPC into a means of social, economic and cultural progress. It is argued that in the PRC in this historical period, neo-authoritarianism was primarily a political discourse, which was adapted and used in the concept of the Three Represents. Then, the perception, discussion, and criticism of the Three Represents are analyzed separately in China itself as well as in the West. It is noted that Chinese scholars generally consider the Three Represents to be the latest achievement of Sinified Marxism, a product of historical materialism, and an answer to the practical questions of modernity. For Western scholars, the opinion is inherent that this theory is not an ideology as such, but is a compendium of insignificant slogans designed to perpetuate Jiang Zemin’s power. Most Western researchers believe that the Three Represents should be interpreted as the creation of a new party identity, its image in modern society, and the goals of the activity. It is concluded that in the Three Represents there was a rejection of utopian ideals and focus was made on the practical tasks of building socialism with Chinese characteristics.

Keywords: CCP, Deng Xiaoping theory, ideas of Mao Zedong, Ideology, Marxism-Leninism, neo-authoritarianism, neo-conservatism, Three Represents

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