

UDC (510)(470+571)355/359+327

## DETERMINANTS OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE CHINESE AND RUSSIAN NAVAL FORCES IN THE THIRD DECADE OF THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY

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The Russian-Chinese cooperation conducted on sea basin conducted in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is aimed at limiting the US ability to control global transport routes, especially energy transport carriers. The community of interests outlined in this way allows for undertaking a number of political and economic initiatives and the use of demonstration of strength in regions where the national interests of both countries are located. Its scope is limited by existing divergences, which particularly concern the European policy of both countries. Chinese plans to build the *One Belt One Road* transport system are violating the status quo in Eurasia in favour of Beijing. While under the Asian policy both countries have managed to reach a compromise regarding the way of economic activity and the formula for building this merger, the scale of divergence of interests in Europe limits the possibility of reaching a similar agreement. Russia's goal is primarily to limit the US's ability to control northern shipping routes, followed by maintaining political and economic influence in Europe in the context of China's increasing activity and the gradual decrease in the demand for energy resources. For China, the goal is to make the most effective use of the transport system to Europe, ultimately based on the *One Belt One Road* project, which means that they are interested in cooperation with countries recognized by Russia as strategic, regional partners of the USA (United Kingdom, Poland, Romania, Iceland). Therefore, the only common strategic goals of both countries in relation to Europe are striving to transfer the burden of US maritime activity from Asian reservoirs to the waters of the North Atlantic and the seas surrounding Europe. However, the Chinese from this group exclude the Baltic Sea, which is to be an area of political stability. However, in the assumptions of Russian policy, the Baltic is to be a substitute region for conducting Arctic rivalry. The existing discrepancies mean that the scope of European cooperation of both countries is limited and will focus on limiting the American dominance on maritime shipping routes and economic undertakings enabling the realization of the interests of both countries. On the other hand, the difference in potentials means that China is the beneficiary of this cooperation to a greater extent, which will cause its further limitations and the need to conduct individual policy in specific subject and geographical areas.

**Key words:** Russia, China, sea basins, maritime policy, cooperation.

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## Introduction

The economic and political transformations of the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century led to significant changes in the policy of China and Russia. These concepts were presented in various strategic documents, but their common feature was the priority treatment of trade exchange carried out by sea, recognition of the role of the global energy trading system as one of the most important factors creating development processes [Распоряжение Правительства 2003, I; Распоряжение Правительства 2009, I; IV, 2; V; Стратегия 2020, 2010, II, 16; State Council of the People's Republic of China 2015b, 2–4; State Council of the People's Republic of China 2006, I–II; State Council of the People's Republic of China 2015a, 3–4]. The achievement of the status of an energy power (*super-petrostate*<sup>1</sup>). This assumption defined the scope of possible Russian-Chinese cooperation. The area of cooperation was marked by two factors in the form of the necessary limitation of the US ability to control regions for the extraction and transport of energy resources, which both countries regard as the most serious threat to their security and ensuring continuity of supply and “economic ties” of selected regions. In contrast, the fields of potential conflicts determine:

- geographical location of potential importers and exporters of energy resources in the regions of location of vital interests of both powers;
- the scale and nature of mutual economic cooperation enabling the political and economic dominance of the partner (the scale of Chinese investments in Russia and the volume of energy imports);
- different vision of the *super-petrostate* status and the resulting concept of achieving this status;
- the importance of American *neo-naval*<sup>2</sup> policy for the level of economic security in both countries.

The most serious limitation of the scope of cooperation in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century was the Russian vision of super-petrostate, which assumed domination of the supply system to Eurasia, while the instrument of achieving this goal was modified concepts of the *land power* of Wieniamin Semenov Tien-Shansky and *Heaterland* of Halford Mackinder [Семенов Тянь-Шанский 1915; Mackinder 1904]<sup>3</sup>. The compromise reached in 2005–2010 assumed joint investments in Asian transmission

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<sup>1</sup> The author defines the concept of *super-petrostate* as a country which development and political position depends on the trading of energy carriers, but at the same time is resistant to fluctuations in the market for their trading and has the ability to partially create the way this market functions.

<sup>2</sup> The author uses this concept to define the American vision of using the armed forces and conducting point expansion. This applies in particular to the US's ability to conduct political and military operations in two regions for a minimum of six months, or political and economic operations protected by military potential, as well as the ability to base and transfer forces to any region of the world. The formula of the activities carried out was to ensure the United States control of the freight system through maritime presence at nodal points of global trade. In the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, they were located mainly in the Indian and Pacific oceans and the Mediterranean, Arabian and Black seas (the Ormuz Bab del Mandab strait, Malacca, Bosphorus and Dardanelles, as well as the Suez and Panama canals). Successively, in the second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the important of the Antarctic Ocean waters with the Bering Strait and the Baltic, Caspian and Azov seas increased. See US Navy, Chief on Naval Operations. (2006): *Navy Strategic Plan in support of Program Objective Memorandum 08*, May 2006, <http://edocs.nps.edu/2014/May/NSP-POM08.pdf>, Department of Navy, US Coast Guard. (2016): *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Sea power*, March 2015. URL: <https://www.navy.mil/local/maritime/150227-CS21R-Final.pdf>.

<sup>3</sup> The theory of land power assumes that such a state should have a centralist character, be dominated by the executive power, which fully controls the regions and resources determining its superpower position, and have the ability to dominate the border area. This region should be vassalized in such a way that it would be impossible to use it to conduct hostile actions against the land power. On the other hand, the theory of *Heaterland*, apart from the concept of subordinating subsequent regions (land expansion) also assumes a necessary confrontation with the maritime power over global domination in the long run.

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system from Russia (Siberia) and Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan), which enabled Russia to invest in the fuel sector and guaranteed a minimum level of diversification of energy supplies to China. This led to the formal exclusion of the *Middle Kingdom* from the area of Russian expansion and Russia's consideration of Chinese interests in Central Asia in exchange for Moscow obtaining the right to build the Eurasian Economic Union (EUA) and the possibility of cooperation with ASEAN countries. This compromise, however, did not offset the major threat to Chinese economic policy, i.e. the American ability to fully control sea communication lines along the southern and eastern coasts of Asia. As a result, the country was forced to conduct maritime activities in the waters of the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea, which was clearly emphasized in the then-binding security strategy [State Council of the People's Republic of China 2006, 22–23, 35–36]. The necessity for China to conduct a policy characteristic of the global maritime power in the absence of instruments for conducting it (insufficient number and distribution of naval bases enabling continuous presence of ships in a given basin) also determined the manner of conducting maritime policy. It was modified in 2012, after the fiasco of attempts to compete with the USA in the Indian Ocean. The adopted concept assumed the achievement of global maritime power status in 2050, in three stages (providing the ability to control waters designated by the *First* and *Second Island Chain*, obtaining the ability to have a permanent maritime presence within a radius of 1800 nautical miles from its own coasts and, as a consequence – the status of a maritime power).

Similar reasons also determine the Russian maritime policy<sup>4</sup>. The development concepts adopted by the Russian state defined the role of individual sea basins, and the mode of action within the so-called Regional Directions of the National Maritime Policy [Указ Президента... 1997, 10–13, Морская доктрина... 2015, 16–17]. Strategic importance has been assigned to the Arctic direction due to the role of energy carriers export, and the American involvement in the Arctic, in particular the possibility of controlling the northern routes of maritime trade exchange [Указ Президента РФ 2017, I, 10, 12]. As a result, both countries decided to enter into a joint rivalry with the United States. The difference in the navy potential (especially the Russian navy's failure to adapt to the specifics of *flag presentation and strength*<sup>5</sup> in sea areas and limited opportunities to stay outside its own sea areas) meant that it was limited to selected areas. The scope of this cooperation is determined by the political compromise consisting in defining the waters that constitute the area of domination of one of the power on which the other will conduct maritime activities in a formula that does not infringe on the partner's interests or supports his activities as well as conducting joint ventures in the field of freedom of navigation. The waters between East Africa and the Persian Gulf and the east coast of China were considered to be subject to Chinese dominance. The Russians also accepted the policy of expanding the homing system, referred to as a *string of pearls*<sup>6</sup>. However, Russia maintained

<sup>4</sup> The author puts forward the thesis that in 2000–2018, the role of the Russian great strategy was played by mutually correlated strategies: energy, transport, security and maritime doctrine and the concept of foreign policy in the primacy of energy strategy. Since 2018, the most important strategy has been played by the Economic Security Strategy until 2030, while the remaining ones (the energy strategy is replaced by the doctrine of energy security) are sectoral strategies to ensure the achievement of its partial goals.

<sup>5</sup> These activities are routine tasks of naval forces. The presentation of the flag means a constant presence in a given area, protection of own interests and response to abuse by users of the sea regulations set out in the Convention on the Law of the Sea. The presentation of strength is emphasizing the ability to conduct military operations to protect one's own interests or forcibly enforce the law of the sea or other international regulations. The most commonly used formula of activities are tactical episode exercises or comprehensive sea exercises.

<sup>6</sup> It consists of a base of atomic submarines on the island of Hainan, an airbase on the Woody Island (Paracel Islands), naval bases in Chittagong (Bangladesh), Sittwe (Myanmar), Gwadar in Pakistan and Hambantota (Sri Lanka) and the airport on Cocos Islands (Myanmar) and a naval base and logistics centres in Obock (Djibouti).

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its monopoly on the northern waters of the globe from the Atlantic through the Antarctic Ocean to the Bering and Okhotsk Seas and the Mediterranean Sea. A new dimension to this community of interests was given by two projects, i.e. the Chinese *One Belt One Road* initiative and the American concept of energy carriers export to the so-called *strategic partners*. Both projects have radically expanded the area of indispensable maritime activity of Russia and China and the need to protect their interests in partner-dominated regions. The *One Belt One Road* initiative, especially its inland part (*New Silk Road*) is brought down to a kind of economic and political bond between the countries of Central Asia and Central and Eastern Europe, i.e. areas lying in the Russian sphere of influence and obtaining the ability to conduct unrestricted maritime activity in strategic waters for Russia (Mediterranean and Baltic Sea). On the other hand, the concept of eliminating the threats related to US energy exports is achieved by Russia through an increase in exports to Asian countries, which is also associated with the need to pursue an economic and political policy of countries in the Chinese sphere of influence. Political realities thus determine the field of Russian-Chinese cooperation and competition.

#### **Political and economic conditions of Russian-Chinese cooperation in sea areas**

The scope of the Russian-Chinese cooperation on sea waters is determined by three issues. The first is China's pursuit of the status of a US maritime player equivalent to the Pacific and Indian Ocean, treated as ensuring the security of supply of raw materials and intermediates for the Chinese economy [Preston..., 2016, 8–9]<sup>7</sup>. The second should be the issue of Russian economic security, which was defined as the ability to exploit new deposits of energy resources in the Arctic shelf and export energy carriers at a level that allows the implementation of state development processes [Указ Президента РФ... 2017, II, 14–15, III, 20; Указ Президента РФ... 2019, 22, 27]. The third is to gain the ability to control areas of trade exchange under the *One Belt One Road* project, which requires a maritime presence in the Red, Mediterranean and Baltic Seas, and ultimately – the Antarctic Ocean.

The scope and formula of cooperation between naval forces

The scope of Russian-Chinese cooperation has mainly the economic and political dimension, and the novelty that emerged in the second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century was the use of its military potential. This cooperation can be described as a “limited community of interests” than a “limited strategic partnership”<sup>8</sup>. Its main goal is to shape the political and economic relations of continental and south-eastern Asia, and the Far East desirable for both countries and to limit the American dominance in the selected sea areas. In practice, it brings down to mutual acceptance of some of the strategic interests located in selected regions of Eurasia and the Pacific region and the gradual expansion of cooperation in energy projects. Beijing's acceptance of the formula for Russian economic expansion in Asia was compensated by Moscow by correlating Asian investment plans with China's energy policy and supporting Chinese activities

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<sup>7</sup> According to economic estimates, in 2020, China will import as much as 39 of 45 minerals necessary for the economy, including as much as 70 % of crude oil. The group of the most important exporting countries are overseas countries, such as Australia, Persian Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Oman, Iraq, United Arab Emirates), Africa (Angola, South Africa), and both Americas (Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, the USA and Canada).

<sup>8</sup> Since 2017, the phrase “strategic partnership” has often appeared in the Russian media (Sputnik), as well as in President Putin's statements. In contrast, the statements of Chinese leaders rather the information about “deepened relations” occurs. It was only in the report of the Xinhua agency from the visit of President Xi Jinping on June 5, 2019 that the phrase about the pursuit of building a strategic partnership appeared (China and Russia agreed on Wednesday to upgrade their relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era) [Xinhua 2019].

in the Middle Pacific and Indian Ocean<sup>9</sup>. The objectives of maritime policies adopted by both countries mean that they are forced to conduct maritime activity in waters located at a considerable distance from their own naval bases and to use assemblies of ships which their navy fleets do not possess. In the case of China, apart from the waters surrounding southern and eastern Asia, the Red Sea, the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea and the Baltic Sea have become the area of maritime activity. In Russian policy, due to the prospective export of energy carriers to South America and Southeast Asia, the importance of the Middle Atlantic and Pacific increased. However, realistically assessed maritime capabilities only guarantee the possibility of control and temporary sea presence in some of these reservoirs.

Table 1

**The needs for Chinese and Russian sea control capabilities**

Russia		China	
Needs	Possibilities	Needs	Possibilities
North Atlantic, Mediterranean Sea, Black Sea and Azov Sea, Baltic Sea	Black Sea and Azov Sea, Baltic Sea, partly North Atlantic – only force presentation by aviation and submarines, Mediterranean – temporary presence	Central Pacific, especially Yellow Sea, East China Sea, Philippine Sea, South China Sea, part of the waters around Indonesia	Yellow Sea East China Sea Partly Philippine Sea
Barents Sea, Arctic Ocean, East Siberian Sea and <i>Northern Sea Route</i> <sup>1</sup>	Barents Sea, Arctic Ocean, East Siberian Sea and <i>Northern Sea Route</i>	Indian Ocean, especially Andaman Sea Arabian Sea Red Sea Lakkadiv Sea	temporary presence in a selected basin
North-Eastern Pacific, seas: Bering, Okhotsk, Japanese, Yellow, East China	Independent seas: Bering, Okhotsk, Japanese, other waters only in cooperation with the PRC	Mediterranean Sea	Temporary presence in a selected area
Indian Ocean	Only in cooperation with the Republic of India		
Caspian	Full control limited for political reasons		

*Own study based on: [Указ Президента РФ... 1997, 10–13; Указ Президента РФ... 2015, 16–17; Huang An-Hao 2009; State Council 2015a]*

The ability of control of both countries necessary to ensure their economic security of sea areas determined the nature and intensity of cooperation on sea areas. Due to the limited possibilities of staying in selected waters compared to the American fleet, the basic formula for conducting joint maritime operations were and will remain military exercises and participation in transnational projects, especially regarding sea control and combating criminal activities in sea areas. Activities carried out as part of the international community will focus on eliminating the dangers of navigation in sea areas or responses to crisis situations [Jianing 2015]. The latter are

<sup>9</sup> Until 2012, the Russian fleet focused its activities mainly on the waters of the Bering, Okhotsk and Yellow seas.

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mainly to combat acts of piracy and terrorism at sea, which are also to emphasize the ability to participate in maritime stabilization operations [Указ Президента... 2016, 24, 28, 77–86]<sup>10</sup>. The scale of the forces involved is also intended to present the ability to act in a given body of water and have combat potential capable not only of *presenting the flag* but also of *presenting the strength*<sup>11</sup>. Their inherent feature, as confirmed by the formula of involvement in the anti-piracy operation, will be the use of these activities to sanction the right of presence in the region in a way that prevents the US response. They will take the form of actions aimed at ensuring the possibility of conducting unrestricted navigation, including actions aimed at reflection of seized vessels and interruption of blockade activities [Naval interaction..., 2015]. It should also be assumed that episodes emphasizing the ability to enforce their national interests in sea areas (counteracting undertakings limiting exploitation and exploration in the open sea, in the *Exclusive Economic Zone* and *maritime disputed area*. This goal is guided by some of the exercises conducted over the years 2015–2018, and it has been officially confirmed that from 2019 it will be the main element of the Naval Joint exercises [Russia, China... 2019]<sup>12</sup>. They took the form of training teams of ships to conduct offensive tactical episodes in the form of landing operations, aimed at the capture or reflection of the islands, conducting artillery and rocket shelling of surface vessels, combating sea submarines and taking over shipping vessels. They will also be conducted in the open sea in waters important for both countries.

#### **Maritime cooperation as part of the One Belt One Road project**

*The presentation of strength and flag* under the guise of conducting naval exercises is the basic formula for the cooperation of naval forces of Russia and China. It will be conducted with equal intensity and in a different formula, depending on the shape of the interests of both countries in a given basin and in a way that allows for expanding influence in the region. Nevertheless, the most important political and economic determinant shaping the scope of Chinese-Russian cooperation in sea areas will be the *One Belt One Road* project and – to a lesser extent – the organization of the Russian energy exports to the so-called *new (non-traditional) partners*. Both projects require obtaining the ability to reside in specific sea areas, in the case of the *One Belt One Road* project, these are mainly:

- the middle Pacific from Taiwan to Indonesia, the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea and the Eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea, through which the *Marine Silk Road* is to pass;
- the Antarctic Ocean with the Barents Sea forming the *Polar Silk Road*;
- the Baltic which is to be part of the *New Silk Road*.

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<sup>10</sup> Instead, Russia's vision of shaping international security assumed the creation of security enclaves in the regions as a uniform area of stability, covering the Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian and Pacific regions. The uniform security area proposed by the Russians does not cover all areas generating threats to international security, especially Africa and Central American, and excluded the North American continent from this area, which can only be assessed as an attempt to weaken transatlantic ties.

<sup>11</sup> During this period, the basic offensive ship of the Russian fleet were nuclear submarines, which essence of operation is secretiveness. The Chinese fleet, on the other hand, had destroyer-class surface units that were only able to match the combat qualities of the Japanese Naval Self-Defense Forces.

<sup>12</sup> These are annual joint manoeuvres of the Russian and Chinese fleets conducted since 2012. Until 2018, they were anti-piracy, anti-terrorist and rescue operations.

Table 2

**Joint manoeuvres by the naval forces of Russia and China in 2012–2019**

Term	Water area	Involved forces	Purpose of exercises
April 2012	Yellow Sea	25 warships, 13 planes, 9 helicopters	defending a group of ships against an attack from the sea, detecting and combating enemy surface, underwater and air units, including firing surface and air targets, escorting ships, returning units taken over by pirates or terrorists, conducting rescue operations
July 2013	Sea of Japan	18 surface ships, 1 submarine, 3 airplanes, 5 ship-launched helicopters	
May 2014	Est China Sea	14 warships, 2 submarines, 9 airplanes, 6 helicopters	
May 2015	Mediterranean Sea (Black Sea)	18 warships	
August 2015	Sea of Japan	23 vessels, 2 submarines	
September 2016	South China Sea	18 ship and support vessels, 21 aircraft	fighting submarines, landing operations, including the capture and defense of islands, conducting rescue operations
July 2017	Baltic Sea	13 warships, multi-purpose ship borne helicopters, 24 tactical boats	jointly combating threats at sea, defense of a group of ships against an attack from the sea, fighting submarines
September 2017	Sea of Japan, Okhotsk Sea	11 ships, 2 submarines, 4 anti-submarine warfare aircraft, 4 ship-borne helicopters	
September 2018	Bering Sea, Okhotsk Sea, Kronotsky Bay, Avah Bay	80 combat and logistic ships	transfer of forces to distant regions, escorting landing operations, defense of the naval group of ships against sea attacks,
April/May 2019	Yellow Sea	13 naval vessels, 7 fixed-wing aircrafts, 4 helicopters and 80 marines	repelling the attack from the sea, conducting a landing to capture the occupied island

*Source: own study based on information from the Russian and Chinese defense ministries*

On the other hand, in relations to the Russian vision of energy carriers export to new recipients, these reservoirs are the North and Central Pacific and the Atlantic, the Antarctic Ocean, and the Baltic sea and the Black Sea treated together with the Mediterranean Sea. The role of individual water bodies in these concepts determines the scope of cooperation and rivalry of both regional powers. For Russia, it is and will remain a function of the ongoing rivalry with the US for control over the northern sea areas, which are able to be the route of energy carriers export and the policy of eliminating the excessive growth of China's position in Central Asia, which occurs as a result of the implementation of the *New Silk Road* project. The scope of cooperation in the Middle Pacific and Indian Ocean, which will take the dimension of sporadic exercises of marine components, will be reduced gradually. Russia will be more involved in anti-piracy activities carried out with the countries of the region. They will be implemented in a supranational system and will be based on the provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea to minimize the possible occurrence of disputes on the Beijing-Moscow route, because the partners participating in these undertakings will be countries in dispute with China, i.e. Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, Burma

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and India. On the other hand, the burden of the Chinese-Russian cooperation will be transferred to the waters of the Red Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, as presence in this region is in the interest of both countries, and the creation of a Chinese naval base in Djibouti balances the ability of both countries to operate in these waters. While the activities carried out in the Indian Ocean basins from the Malacca Strait to the Red Sea and the northern Pacific (Bering, Okhotsk Sea) will take on an individualistic dimension. A key role in the shape of Russian-Chinese cooperation will be played by how to shape mutual relations in the use of the *New Silk Road*, and especially the *Polar Silk Road*. Each of the variants of the route proposed by China took into account Russia's role in this project and part of its interests<sup>13</sup>. The joint decision is to determine the optimal routes for the *New Silk Road* through Russia or its satellites and in areas where it will be possible to overcome the American supremacy. It should be emphasized, however, that the side that sought to reach such a compromise was Russia, for which the goal is the maximum correlation of the EUA's development strategy with the *Silk Road* project, both in the context of its continental routes and joint shaping of relations with Asian transit countries [Putin... 2017]. As a consequence of this compromise, China has secured the right to free construction and to determine the level of Russian involvement in projects focused on creating China-Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean transport networks, especially the China-Pakistan and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar corridors. And projects that will most likely be implemented independently by Beijing will continue to be connection projects to the countries of the Persian Gulf and East Africa.

#### **The importance of Polar Silk Road for the China-Russia cooperation process**

The concept of the Arctic maritime connection from China to Europe (*Polar Silk Road*) presented in 2018 was supposed to be part of the newly constructed Chinese Arctic policy. In 2013–2018, it was limited to three goals, the most important of which was to respond to attempts to obtain the status of Arctic player by Japan and South Korea<sup>14</sup>. Less importance was then attached to the possibilities of cooperation with Russia, considering that investments in the process of exploiting Siberian deposits, for strategic reasons, should be focused on land transport<sup>15</sup>. Thus, the potential for using Arctic shipping routes to carry freight was seen as a threat of losing control over Russia's energy export policy to the Far East and South Asia. Limiting these possibilities was the third goal of China's Arctic policy, and the adopted formula of action is to obtain the status of an Arctic player who will focus not so much on the issue of future Arctic exploration, but on the use of the sailing qualities of the Arctic Ocean (the possibilities of using the *Northwest Passage*, *Northern Sea Route* and possibly the *Transpolar Sea Route*)<sup>16</sup>. Due to the specificity of solutions

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<sup>13</sup> It can even be said that these proposals were based on an analysis of the nature of Russian regional interests in relation to Central Asia and South Caucasus, as well as south-eastern Europe, especially Ukraine and Moldova.

<sup>14</sup> These countries announced the assumptions of their Arctic policy in the years 2013 and 2015.

<sup>15</sup> The promoted WSTO project enabled obtaining supplies from a Central Asian country and provided China with the ability to control Russian supplies to South Korea and Japan.

<sup>16</sup> *Northwest Passage* runs through Canadian archipelagos and is considered by this country to be a route using internal waters, which requires permission to use it. *Northern Sea Route* is a route along the coast of Siberia, passing through the Russian EEZ, therefore subject to the principle of freedom of navigation. However, it is treated by Russia as a strategic route and the Russian state uses various forms of limiting navigation possibilities, but – which should be emphasized – in accordance with the law and practice of its application. Whereas *Transpolar Sea Route* runs through international waters and is the shortest of these routes. The level of icing means that it is currently only possible to navigate using icebreakers. The Chinese were the first to direct the ship along this route in 2017, in fact being an icebreaker.

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of international law of the sea<sup>17</sup> and Canadian solutions regarding the *Northwest Passage*, Chinese policy was limited to obtaining only the status of an observer in the Arctic Council and successive establishment of economic contacts with the Nordic countries. As a consequence of this policy, China has obtained the planned status of *Arctic stakeholder* and a country legitimately demanding compliance with the principle of freedom of navigation in the Arctic waters, in accordance with the Convention on the Law of the Sea. The change in this policy that took place in 2018 is the result of two processes, which should be considered the opportunities offered by the export of Russian energy carriers of the *Novatek Yamal LNG* and *Arctic LNG 2*<sup>18</sup> terminals and the Russian policy itself of using the north-west passage using the *Northern Sea Route*. The plans for the expansion of Siberian fuel and energy complexes require the supply of elements of mining, transmission and processing infrastructure by sea, also from outside the Federation. Thus, Russia is forced to accept the very right to navigate this route of trade vessels bearing the flag of other countries. For this reason, it limits – in relations to solutions applied by Canada to the rules of *Northwest Passage* route flow – the scope of regulations regarding the flow of this route to fulfil specific administrative obligations and the application of a tariff for specific navigation and sailing services, including the obligation to use the services of Russian icebreakers.

#### **The energetic community of interests**

The announcement by the American administration of the conditions under which energy carriers can be exported from the United States has marked another area of Chinese-Russian cooperation, which is basically a deepening of energy cooperation. The decision to direct US LNG exports to the so-called *strategic partners* has been recognized as a significant threat both in economic (loss of part of income due to crowding out of the market) and political (limiting the possibility of *economic binding* of selected regions through the export of energy carriers). The current formula (until 2030) of the Russian reaction has been specified in the *economic security strategy*. [Указ Президента... 2017, II, 14, 15; V, 32–33] and detailed in the energy security doctrine from 2019 [Указ Президента РФ... 2019, 8–19]. The adopted concept for the development of the fuel and energy sector assumes the expansion of raw material processing systems for processed energy carriers and their export. The location of major innovative and modernization projects, i.e. the Far East, eastern Siberia as well as the Jamaican Peninsula and the northern continental shelf, also highlighted the role of maritime transport in the Pacific waters. It has become possible to transport processed energy resources and oil products by sea both across the Atlantic and the Pacific, which allows expanding the group of importing countries. This assumption has fundamentally changed the role of Russian-Chinese cooperation, as Russian economic activity has been concentrated in regions where Chinese strategic interests are located. An additional factor changing China's role in Russian policy is the way of export, which will be carried out mainly by sea. An essential condition for the implementation of this concept is to obtain the possibility

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<sup>17</sup> Countries with the right to the Arctic Continental shelf after the entry into force of the Convention on the Law of the Sea have established in the Arctic the exclusive economic zones (EEZ), in which they have the right to conduct scientific research, exploitation and protection of natural resources, and jurisdiction regarding the construction and use of artificial islands, installations and structures, and the preservation of the marine environment. The other states in these waters have the right to freedom of navigation, overflight and arrangement of submarine cables and pipelines, which is used by China.

<sup>18</sup> Especially since the Chinese concerns are the owner of 30% of shares in these enterprises and import about 4 million tonnes of LNG produced in them.

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of free use of navigable Arctic-Atlantic and Arctic-Pacific basins, as well as the Pacific itself. Obtaining the possibility of creating a situation in the waters of the Pacific Ocean, in a much broader dimension than the Okhotsk, Yellow or South China seas, required acceptance of this form of Russia activity by China. Another, negative for the current formula of export policy, consequence of the transformation assumptions of the Russian fuel and energy sector is the reduction in the export capacity of energy resources, especially natural gas. This would potentially allow Central Asian exporters to enter the European markets that could use the Black Sea and Mediterranean shipping routes. The third dominant that has redefined the role of the Russia-PRC partnership is the potential possibility of Russian hegemony in the Arctic waters, especially the Barents Sea. The above conditions, and in particular the need to increase our presence in sea basins, has redefined cooperation with China.

Between competition and cooperation in north-eastern Europe

When assessing the development of Chinese-Russian cooperation in Asia and southern Europe and the seas surrounding these areas, one should point to a significant joint interests and skilful correlation of vital interests. It should also be recognized that similar correlations will be difficult to obtain in relation to Arctic and Baltic policies. This will directly translate into the nature of maritime activities carried out in the waters of the Arctic Ocean and the Baltic Sea.

The Baltic region – cooperation or rivalry

Recognition by the US of Poland as the most important strategic recipient of LNG caused that Russia was forced to open the Baltic Sea basin for the Chinese war fleet. The consequence of joint maritime manoeuvres carried out in 2017 is, de facto, recognition by Moscow of Chinese trade interests in Europe (Putin). The Baltic, which was to be, according to the assumptions of the sea doctrine, a sea under the full control of the Russian Baltic Fleet was included in the Chinese plan to build efficient, safe and effective transport routes, including those connecting the most important sea ports [Vision and Actions, III, 2015]<sup>19</sup>. The inclusion of the Baltic Sea as an element of the *Silk Road* should be considered one of the crisis-making decisions in the mutual relations of both countries. The shape of the Baltic transport routes is determined by political objectives in relation to the partner and in the regional and global dimension. The main factor creating potential threats to Chinese-Russian cooperation is the issue of including Russian imports as well as internal trade in goods in the *Silk Road* transport system. This solution increases the economic efficiency of Asia-Europe rail connections and limits the scope of opening the Chinese market to exports of goods from Europe. However, at the same time, it leads to an increase in the dependence of the way these connections operate from Russia, which changes the relationship between China and Russia to the detriment of China. It also eliminates, from Beijing's point of view, the scope of potential cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe under the

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<sup>19</sup> The Belt and Road run through the continents of Asia, Europe and Africa, connecting the vibrant East Asia economic circle at one end and developed European economic circle at the other, and encompassing countries with huge potential for economic development. The Silk Road Economic Belt focuses on bringing together China, Central Asia, Russia and Europe (the Baltic); linking China with the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea through Central Asia and West Asia; and connecting China with Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean. The 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road is designed to go from China's coast to Europe through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean in one route, and from China's coast through the South China Sea to the South Pacific in the other. [...] At sea, the Initiative will focus on jointly building smooth, secure and efficient transport routes connecting major sea ports along the Belt and Road.

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16+1 formula<sup>20</sup>. Countries which, due to their geographical location and economic potential, play the role of regional leaders of the *Silk Road* project in Chinese assumptions are Poland, Hungary and Romania. The positive reaction, especially of Poland [Polish Silk Road 2018]<sup>21</sup> meant that Russia's goal is to force China to correct the route of the Trail and carry it across the Baltic. The Russians mainly emphasize the need to include the Baltic ports as transshipment hubs and *Silk Road* logistics centres. This policy is positively supported by Estonia and the Federal Republic of Germany, although for Germany, an alternative solution may be a land connection via Jyväskylä to Duisburg. The above conditions determined the formula of China's Baltic policy, and thus the areas of Russian-Chinese rivalry and cooperation in the regional dimension. For China's export policy, the Federal Republic of Germany remains the principal partner as a place of export supply to the European Union market. The main role of the Logistics Centre *Duisburg AG* as a place for the redistribution of goods and the scale of exports to Scandinavia and Great Britain determines the extent of Chinese involvement in the Baltic region. The optimal solution is to use Poland as a transit country and Jyväskylä logistics centre together with container terminals in Gdansk and Gdynia, but also in correlation with the functioning and planned rail connections of the Nordic countries. This solution ensures the transshipment efficiency of the main sea and land hubs of the European Union (Duisburg, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Hamburg), and in relation to exports to the Nordic countries, also allows to reduce the delivery time. The alternative in the form of the use of eastern Baltic ports, especially the Russian ones, located in the Gulf of Finland or the ports of Estonia and Latvia (and ultimately the extended port in Kaliningrad) is justified only in the context of using them for transport by German-Russian motorways of the sea (to Rostock and Sassnitz – Mukran). As a consequence, the ports of Hamburg and Bremen as well as the Duisburg logistics centre will remain the main transshipment hubs. Therefore, the above situation is treated in China as an alternative, and Russia considers it to be the target. In this arrangement of transport lines, China will have to accept the use of Russian transport systems (Trans-Siberian railway) and adapt the *Silk Road* threat system to the shape of Russian internal trade in goods. This also creates the potential need to accept them in a way that allows the use of Russian ports as transshipment and distribution locations for Chinese exports. The negative of this solution is the need to accept Russian interests in Europe, especially in the Black Sea catchment area and Central Europe. It also requires Beijing to refer to the way Russia conducts its policy towards Ukraine, Georgia and Poland. In practice, this may lead to the abandonment of one of the alternative *Silk Road* routes, i.e.

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<sup>20</sup> This cooperation formula has been in operation since 2012 and is created by the PRC and Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia. For Beijing, initially the economic goal was increasing investment involvement, but since 2015 the goal is to implement the *Silk Road* project. Among the countries of the region interested in the significant involvement of China are Hungary and Serbia, Romania, and from the Baltic States: Estonia and Poland.

<sup>21</sup> The scale of Polish involvement in the implementation of the project can be proved by the calendar of meetings and statements of representatives of political authorities. In 2015–2018, visits to China, during which talks were held about Polish participation in this project, were visited by President Duda (2015) and the then Prime Minister, Beata Szydło (2017). The purposes of adjusting the investment into the logistics and transport system to the Path project were indicated by both the then Prime Minister M. Morawiecki, and the deputy minister in the development ministry P. Chorożyński, while the present minister of infrastructure A. Adamczyk emphasizes the convergence of this project with the Polish interests. A similar position is taken by a Polish member of the Board of Directors of the Asian Bank for Infrastructure Investments Radosław Pyffel. See: [Polish Silk Road 2018; Nie możemy... 2017].

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the route through southern Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia (Poti port), Ukraine (Odessa port) and Kiev to Jydy. It is rather a project intended to weaken Russia's position in the consortium implementing the *One Belt One Road* project, rather than a real option. However, it is an important instrument of influence and must therefore remain in Chinese concepts as potential scenarios for action.

In Russian policy, the way of using national transport systems and – in addition – port infrastructure on the Baltic Sea is treated as a means to deepen the scope of bilateral cooperation with China and the Federal Republic of Germany. By emphasizing this community of interests with Beijing, they seek to dominate the Baltic transport system. However, in Russian policy, Germany is perceived as a state – a distributor of Russian energy resources to the EU and imports of technological equipment components to Russia, necessary to modernize the fuel and energy sector. The essence of Russian activities is therefore to create ventures that allow the expansion of transmission systems in the EU and their integration with *Nord Stream* and bypassing the Central Europe region as a transit area. An attempt to transfer this exchange from land areas to the Baltic Sea, by using the Baltic ports of the Federal Republic of Germany and the motorways of the Rostock and Sassnitz – Mukran seas, and Russian ports, however, is contrary to Chinese Baltic projects<sup>22</sup>. The presented conditions mean that there is more competition than cooperation between Beijing and Moscow in the Baltic region. This region is not a place of conducting joint economic initiatives or investments. In fact, based on the Chinese analysis of investment activity in Europe, it can be stated that some of them are aimed at limiting the need to conduct joint Chinese-Russian ventures. Beijing has an independent investment policy in Europe, which has been focused on European economic and political powers (Germany, Great Britain, France) and countries important for the shape of trade (Norway, Sweden, Poland, Finland, Italy, Greece, Hungary). Investment activity, with the exception of Poland, was focused on such spheres of the economy as the municipal services sector, transport, infrastructure, energy and the machinery industry. In the case of Poland, after the fiasco of the concept of investment in the construction of transport systems, freight traffic in ports is the leading sphere. You can even indicate areas of competition that focuses on the possibility of choosing alternative to Russian transport routes. The most important, specific fields of competition are the *China-Europe Land-Sea Express*<sup>23</sup> project and the China's policy towards *Silk Road*. The first of these projects does not include the Baltic region, while the second one is to eventually connect Odessa with the Baltic ports, and the scope of cooperation between Beijing and Kiev includes a number of projects, including investments in Ukraine and various cooperation initiatives of the economic representations of both countries. However, while in 2016 the decisions on the intensification of economic cooperation between the PRC and Ukraine were announced, the content of talks and conclusions of the special Chinese-Ukrainian

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<sup>22</sup> The leading undertaking is the so-called Maritime Motorways, which are to run between the Baltic ports of Germany (Sassnitz – Mukran, Rostock) and the Russian ports (Baitijsk and Kaliningrad, Ust'Juga, St. Petersburg). The transshipment centres in the Maritime Motorways system is the port of Sassnitz due to its transshipment infrastructure. It is adapted to the service of Russian rail track sets, and the investments carried out jointly by *Российские Железные Дороги* and *Deutsche Bahn* for investments in the ferry-rail transport system Baitijsk – Sassnitz, allow handling of wheel reloading up to 6.5 million tonnes per year. The support, in relations to the *ro-ro* cargo is the Rostock port and a number of investments in the wheel-rail communication system, especially in North Rhine Westphalia.

<sup>23</sup> The project assuming the intermodal connection of Alexandria – Piraeus and rail to Budapest via Serbia.

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forum was not disclosed in 2017 (it was held on November 16, 2017). China's policy with regard to both projects can be described as instrumental. It also indirectly proves that Beijing's creation of Asia-Europe connections alternative to Russian land connections is used to reduce Russia's position in shaping the route and the way the Northern Silk Road functions.

### **Arctic region**

China, with the announcement of the concept of *Polar Silk Road*, began to conduct an independent policy of expanding economic contacts with the Nordic countries, which is to justify the need to use the *Northern Sea Route* as an international open sea route. This does not significantly affect Russian interests, because the use of this route for the transport of energy carriers limits the possibility of regulating shipping principles. However, the Chinese concept of its use creates both fields of cooperation and rivalry with Russia. The area of cooperation is determined by the formula for exporting energy carriers using the ports of Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and Vladivostok. This connection will ultimately be used by Russia to export LNG and oil products, and by China to exchange goods in the containerized goods formula. The Russia-China rail connection system allows for relatively large and fast transport to the ports in Murmansk and – especially – in Arkhangelsk of containerized goods from China. However, the negative side of this solution includes the navigation restrictions in the Arctic waters, which the Russians intend to overcome by the massive use of nuclear-powered icebreakers. The main factor creating the field of competition in Beijing's recognition of the main regional trade partners of Finland, the Greenland Autonomy, and especially Iceland, Great Britain, Sweden and Norway, i.e. a country that plays a strategic role in US policy and countries recognized by Russia as conducting hostile Arctic policy<sup>24</sup>. The second determinant creating a field of confrontation will be the policy of gradually expanding the possibility of conducting Arctic navigation by emphasizing the right to freedom of navigation in waters not being internal waters and the territorial sea of Arctic states. The Chinese will also not decide to implement the 2017 proposal by V. Putin that brings down to the recognition of the *Northern Sea Route* as an element of the *Polar Silk Road* and the implementation of this project in a bilateral system [Путин надеется... 2017]<sup>25</sup>. They will also expand cooperation with the Nordic countries, which will be based on the Kirkenes (Northern Norway) – Oulu in Finland (Finnish Baltic coast) railway project, and Oslo – Stockholm. Iceland, Finland and Greenland will also be treated specifically in Chinese politics. The first of them, which is largely a measure aimed at weakening the US position, is to use this country as a logistics centre for all commercial ventures in the region. On the other hand, Greenland has a policy of slow political and economic linking through investments in the Autonomous mining sector and undertaking various bilateral research projects<sup>26</sup>. Therefore, it should be

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<sup>24</sup> The British remain one of the important recipients of Chinese goods, while in the case of policy towards Norway, the scale of Arctic interests led to a redefinition of Chinese policy and the restoration of political relations in December 2016, suspended after the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Nobel Prize to the dissident Liu Xiaobo (in 2000). A similar policy of investing in sectors enabling the expansion of economic cooperation is pursued towards Sweden, Finland and the Greenland Autonomy. However, the widest cooperation formula was proposed to Iceland, both because of its strategic location and role in the US policy.

<sup>25</sup> “The Silk Road reached the very North. We will combine it with the Northern Sea Route and it will be what we need, and we will make the Northern Sea Route Silk”.

<sup>26</sup> Already in May 2016, a Memorandum of cooperation was signed between the Chinese Ministry of Land and Resources and the Greenland Ministry of Education, Culture, Research and Religions.

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recognized that China's overall Arctic policy assumes the status of an Arctic player who will be able to conduct independent policy in the region. This will significantly reduce the need for cooperation with Russia [China's Arctic Policy 2018].

### **Conclusions**

Chinese-Russia cooperation on maritime waters is shaped by geopolitical factor and global political and economic goals. The main reason is to ensure continuity of supply by sea, mainly energy carriers, and expanding export opportunities. It also allows to achieve partial goals in relation to actions aimed at weakening the US position in global sea basins. The joint activity of naval forces on the seas surrounding the European continent forces the increased activity of the American fleet in these waters. This indirectly limits its activity in the Pacific reservoirs, i.e. areas of implementation of China's national interests. To a lesser extent, this applies to the American presence in the Arctic waters, but it is offset by the Russian policy of creating air and sea incidents in the North Atlantic, as well as the North and Baltic seas. The solution which, in Russian concepts, is to limit the possible reactions of the US and its allies (mainly Great Britain and Canada) is the presence of coalition naval forces in these waters. However, maritime activity in these waters is not a priority for China, which has modified Russia's policy. Russia has attempted to transfer this form of influence to the Baltic Sea, an important area for Beijing. However, the presence of Chinese naval forces is temporary and limited to joint exercises. Beijing will not be able to permanently station its own fleet in this region, which means that it is not interested in creating political tensions that limit the possibility of conducting export expansion. Thus, the political goal will remain to stabilize the situation in the region, also providing for limiting the American presence and the possibility of creating a political situation. In addition, it allows controlling Russian maritime activity, which is treated as one of the creators of export policy and economic expansion. Therefore, it should be recognized that the factor determining Chinese presence in European waters is the awareness of the difference in potential between the US fleets and the Chinese Navy. As noted above, obtaining the potential for global activity and obtaining the status of a global maritime power is possible by increasing the potential of naval forces and obtaining the ability to be stations in selected sea areas. The Chinese gain a significant part of these opportunities through cooperation with Russia. Transferring the rivalry from the USA to a reservoir that does not play a significant role for Chinese interests (outside the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean) is also of considerable importance. Thanks to cooperation with Russia, they can mean the weight of American efforts to focus on the North Atlantic and Northern Europe's waters and the western Arctic Ocean, i.e. in the distance from the most important Asian waters for their interests. At the same time, including Russia in various forms of activity in the Pacific causes a kind of internationalization of its operations, which eliminates the accusation of attempts to appropriate these waters. It also limits the possibility of reaction, competing with China for their control and inclusion of the countries of the region in its Exclusive Economic Zone. For the Russians, this cooperation allows them to gain the ability to contribute to the situation in regions of potential exports of processed energy resources and to obtain political and military support for projects carried out in the Arctic basins. It is obtained at the expense of acceptance of the Chinese presence in the most important European sea basin for Beijing, i.e. the Baltic Sea. However, this presence is incidental and depends on the nature of the political and military cooperation of both countries. However, it allows China to achieve its strategic goals in relation to northern Europe. When assessing the effectiveness of joint ventures between China and Russia on maritime waters, it

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should be acknowledged that they allow to limit American dominance and enable the realization of maritime interests of both countries. They are not always convergent, and the difference in potential means that the beneficiary of this cooperation is China, to a greater extent. This leads to various forms of confrontation between the two partners and forces them to pursue individual policies in specific subject and geographical areas.

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## **ДЕТЕРМІНАНТИ СПІВРОБІТНИЦТВА ВІЙСЬКОВО-МОРСЬКИХ СИЛ КИТАЮ ТА РОСІЇ В ТРЕТЬОМУ ДЕСЯТИЛІТТІ ХХІ СТ.**

*Пьотр Міцкевич*

Російсько-китайське співробітництво в морській сфері у ХХІ столітті спрямоване на обмеження здатності США контролювати глобальні транспортні шляхи, особливо енергетичні транспортні носії. Спільні інтереси, окреслені таким чином, дають змогу здійснювати низку політичних та економічних ініціатив і використовувати демонстрацію сили в регіонах, що мають особливе значення для національних інтересів обох країн. Сфера таких ініціатив обмежена наявними розбіжностями, що особливо стосуються європейської політики обох країн. Китайські плани побудувати транспортну

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систему «Один пояс – один шлях» порушують статус-кво в Євразії на користь Пекіна. Хоча в рамках азіатської політики обом країнам вдалося досягти компромісу щодо способу економічної діяльності й формули, на якій двостороння взаємодія заснована, масштаб розбіжностей інтересів у Європі стримує можливість такого компромісу. Російська мета полягає насамперед в обмеженні спроможності США контролювати північні судноплавні шляхи з подальшим підтримкою політичного й економічного впливу в Європі в контексті зростання активності Китаю та поступового зменшення попиту на енергоносії. Мета Китаю – максимально ефективно використовувати транспортну систему до Європи, зрештою, засновану на проекті «Один пояс – один шлях», що означає, що вони зацікавлені у співпраці з країнами, визнаними Росією стратегічними, регіональними партнерами США (Великобританія, Польща, Румунія, Ісландія). Тому єдиними спільними стратегічними цілями обох країн щодо Європи є прагнення перекласти тягар морської діяльності США з азіатських водойм на води Північної Атлантики та морів, що оточують Європу. Однак китайці із цієї групи акваторій виключають Балтійське море, яке має бути зоною політичної стабільності. Однак, згідно з курсом російської політики, Балтія повинна бути регіоном-замінником для проведення арктичного суперництва. Найвні розбіжності означають, що сфера європейської співпраці обох країн обмежена й буде зосереджена на обмеженні американського домінування на морських судноплавних шляхах та економічних зобов'язаннях, що дадуть змогу реалізувати повною мірою інтереси обох країн. З іншого боку, різниця в потенціалі означає, що Китай отримує перевагу від цього співробітництва більшою мірою, що спричинить його подальші обмеження й необхідність проведення індивідуальної політики в конкретних предметних і географічних галузях.

**Ключові слова:** Росія, Китай, водні басейни, морська політика, співпраця.

## ДЕТЕРМИНАНТЫ СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВА ВОЕННО-МОРСКИХ СИЛ КИТАЯ И РОССИИ В ТРЕТЬЕМ ДЕСЯТИЛЕТИИ XXI ВЕКА

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Российско-китайское сотрудничество, проводимое в морском бассейне в XXI веке, направлено на ограничение возможностей США контролировать глобальные транспортные маршруты, особенно энергоносители. Выявленная таким образом общность интересов позволяет предпринять ряд политических и экономических инициатив и использовать демонстрацию силы в регионах, где находятся национальные интересы обеих стран. Его масштабы ограничены существующими расхождениями, которые особенно касаются европейской политики обеих стран. Планы Китая построить транспортную систему «Один пояс – один путь» нарушают статус-кво в Евразии в пользу Пекина. В то время как в рамках азиатской политики обеим странам удалось достичь компромисса в отношении способа экономической деятельности и формулы построения этого слияния, масштабы расхождения интересов в Европе ограничивают возможность достижения аналогичного соглашения. Цель России состоит в первую очередь в том, чтобы ограничить способность США контролировать северные морские маршруты, а затем сохранить политическое и экономическое влияние в Европе в контексте растущей активности Китая и постепенного снижения спроса на энерго-ресурсы. Китай же преследует другую цель – максимально эффективно использовать транспортную систему в Европе, в конечном итоге на основе проекта «Один пояс – один путь», что означает, что они заинтересованы в сотрудничестве со странами, признанными Россией в качестве стратегических региональных партнеров США (Великобритания, Польша, Румыния, Исландия). Таким образом, единственные общие стратегические цели обеих стран по отношению к Европе – это стремление перенести бремя морской деятельности США с азиатских водоемов на воды Северной Атлантики и морей, окружающих Европу. Однако китайцы из этой группы исключают Балтийское море, которое должно быть зоной политической стабильности. Однако, согласно курсу российской политики, Балтика должна быть регионом, заменяющим

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арктическое соперничество. Существующие разногласия и разночтения означают, что объем европейского сотрудничества обеих стран ограничен и будет сосредоточен на ограничении американского доминирования на морских маршрутах судоходства и экономических обязательствах, позволяющих реализовать интересы обеих стран. С другой стороны, разница в потенциалах двух держав указывает на то, что Китай в большей степени является бенефициаром этого сотрудничества, что приведет к его дальнейшим ограничениям и необходимости вести свою линию политики в ряде сфер и в определенных регионах Мира, руководствуясь собственно своими интересами.

**Ключевые слова:** Россия, Китай, водные бассейны, морская политика, сотрудничество.

*Стаття надійшла до редакції 21.11.2020*