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CHINA'S GLOBAL POWER AMBITION: EXPECTATIONS, OPPORTUNITIES, AND CHALLENGES

Li Jie

PhD in History at the University of Edinburgh in 2017

3 Floor, 21 Ferry Street, Yau Ma Tei, Jordan, Kowloon, Hong Kong

jielican2009@hotmail.com

On his first work day as the President of the United States, Donald Trump signed an executive order to withdraw the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a move that many analysts claim will become a golden opportunity for China to fill in as a global leader. There are expectations both in and outside China for the rising power to play a bigger role in international affairs.

Indeed, in a short span of time China has assembled many of the trappings of a global power. Chinese foreign policy has become more active and assertive since the turn of the century, especially after Xi Jinping became the supreme leader of China in 2012. Major efforts to project China's great power status in recent years include the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015 and the launching of "One Belt One Road (OBOR)" in 2013. A major recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) for decades, China has become a major global investor now, with outbound investment surpassing incoming investment for the first time in 2015. It established its first military logistics base in Djibouti in 2016, and more are likely to follow. With every major foreign policy initiative, China moves closer to achieving its great power dream.

Based on interviews with scholars and officials and analysis of original documents and published works, this paper will examine internal and external debates about the proper role China plays in today's world. While many argue that China must continue to lie low as part of the "*Tao Guang Yang Hui*" strategy, the proponents for China's bigger global role have become increasingly more vocal. What exactly does China want? What are the challenges and obstacles to its great power ambition? How will China's changing foreign policy affect itself as well as the global political economy? This policy-oriented research will have significant implications for China, other major powers, and the international community in general.

Key words: Chinese Dream, One Belt One Road, *Tao Guang Yang Hui*, *You Suo Zuo Wei*, great power ambition, foreign policy, globalisation, international relations.

Introduction

On his first work day as the President of the United States, Donald Trump signed an executive order to withdraw the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a move that many analysts claim would become a golden opportunity for China to fill in as a global leader. The questions are: Does China want such a role? If so, is China ready?

Evidently Chinese foreign policy has become more active since the turn of the century, especially after Xi Jinping became the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012 and PRC President in 2013. Recent efforts to project China's power

abroad include the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015 and the launching of One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative in 2013. A top recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) for decades, China has become a major global investor now, with net outbound investment surpassing incoming investment for the first time in 2015. In foreign aid, China has moved away from net recipient status to net donor status since 2010. China also established its first military logistics base in Djibouti in 2016, with additional such overseas bases likely to follow. In a short span of time China has assembled many of the trappings of a global power. With every major foreign policy initiative, China seems to be moving closer to realizing its great power ambition. Will China replace the United States as the dominant power? What challenges does China face on its path to becoming a global power?

What Does China Want?

If one day China should change her color and turn into a superpower, if she too should play the tyrant in the world, and everywhere subject others to her bullying, aggression and exploitation, the people of the world should identify her as social-imperialism, expose it, oppose it and work together with the Chinese people to overthrow it¹.

In his speech at the United Nations on 10 April 1974, Deng Xiaoping said China was not and would never become a superpower. In the midst of the Cultural Revolution, China did not have the luxury of dreaming of becoming a superpower. As its door became open to the West again in the late 1970s, China's economy began to take off, and by the turn of the century it had become an economic giant, making its great power pursuit possible.

The so-called *Tao Guang Yang Hui* strategy has guided China's foreign policy since the 1980s. In the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident in 1989, Deng told other Chinese leaders that China should "Observe calmly, secure our position, cope with affairs calmly (*Lengjing guancha, wenzhu zhenjiao, chenzhuo yingfu*)"². Though Deng did not use the exact phrase *Tao Guang Yang Hui*, it is clear that he encouraged calmness and low profile as China faced domestic difficulties and Western pressures. The first time Deng actually used *Tao Guang Yang Hui* was in 1992 when he was discussing China's development problems. In his words, "We will only become a big political power if we keep a low profile (*Tao Guang Yang Hui*) and work hard for some years; and we will then have more weight in international affairs"³. In a speech in 1998, PRC President Jiang Zemin further developed the concept and described China's foreign policy principle as "Observe calmly, cope with affairs calmly, never seek leadership, high brightness and cherish obscurity, get some things done (*Lengjing guancha, chenzhuo yingfu, juebu dangtou, taoguang yanghui, yousuo zuowei*)" [Jiang 2003, Vol. 2, 202].

As China has re-emerged to be a major power in the international system in the 21st century, should China stick to the *Tao Guang Yang Hui* strategy or should it focus more on *You Suo Zuo Wei* (get some things done) in its foreign policy? How will China's changing foreign policy affect itself as well as the rest of the world?

The domestic debate over China's foreign policy orientation is inclusive. Until recently China tended to view the international demands for it to shoulder more global responsibilities as part of a conspiracy to thwart its rise. While many argue that China must continue to lie low as part of *Tao Guang Yang Hui*, the proponents for China's bigger global role have become increasingly more vocal. Since 2010

¹ URL: <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/6688/6715/20011023/588430.html>.

² URL: http://www.qstheory.cn/zl/llzz/dxpwjd3j/200906/t20090630_4713.htm.

³ URL: <http://news.takungpao.com.hk/world/watch/2014-08/2684791.html>.

China has emphasized its obligation and capability to contribute to the international community as a great power, and under President Xi its foreign policy has become more assertive from trade to maritime disputes. Notably Xi proposed a “new model of great power relations” in US-China relations in order to avoid structural conflict associated with global power transition. Xi placed China at the same level as the United States in international politics, reminiscent of the concept of G-2, which was coined and embraced by some scholars and former US government officials.

China has a set of ambitious strategic visions about its future. It has taken concrete steps to move steadily to transform it into a 21st century global power. It has the two “100” objectives: to build China into a moderately well-off society by 2021 when the CCP is 100 years old, and a fully developed nation by 2049 when the PRC celebrates its 100th anniversary. Following the success of special economic zones such as Shenzhen and Pudong in the South, the Chinese government declared in April 2017 establishment of the Xiong’an New Area to coordinate development of Jing-Jin-Ji (Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei) in North China.

Although it has benefited enormously from the post-World War II international order, China was not a participant in making the rules of the existing order. It is natural that as China becomes more powerful, it wants to reform the system to better suit its interests. Will China challenge the existing international system? To some extent, yes, but there is no indication that China intends to overthrow the current system or replace the United States as the global power. As Chinese Finance Minister Lou Jiwei explained, for example, the AIIB will complement, not substitute, other multilateral financial institutions including the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank and is compatible with established international lenders. China will continue to support the existing banks in their work of global poverty relief and development⁴.

Some scholars believe China’s opportunity has arrived to be a global power. Yan Xuetong, a leading International Relations scholar in Beijing, asserted that China had a chance to become “a full-fledged superpower if it responds to the Trump presidency by opening up more to the world economically and politically”, meanwhile, Beijing could also “greatly reduce America’s soft-power advantage”⁵. However, the Chinese Foreign Ministry seems less certain. China does not want world leadership but could be forced to assume that role if others step back from that position, Zhang Jun, the director-general of the Foreign Ministry’s international economics department, made the comments during a briefing with foreign journalists. Elaborating on that theme, Zhang said China had no intention of seeking global leadership. “If anyone were to say China is playing a leadership role in the world, I would say it’s not China rushing to the front but rather the front-runners have stepped back, leaving the place to China”, Zhang said. “If China is required to play that leadership role, then China will assume its responsibilities”, he added⁶.

As John Wong suggests, China will remain a “reluctant global player” for a long time to come. The mindset of Chinese leaders has been shaped by their culture and history⁷. Reluctantly or not, China seems ready to “get some things done” in foreign policy, and as a result, China will be more active and more high-profile in international affairs.

⁴ URL: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/21/c_134085918.htm.

⁵ URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/opinion/china-can-thrive-in-the-trump-era.htm>.

⁶ URL: <http://www.businessinsider.com/r-diplomat-says-china-would-assume-world-leadership-if-needed-2017-1>.

⁷ URL: <http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-myths-of-a-china-led-global-order>.

Great Ambition: Moving Closer to Becoming a Global Power

Though generations of Chinese leaders have talked about rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, i.e., making China great again, it is under Xi Jinping's leadership that China has been making substantial strides in realizing the Chinese dream. China is getting closer to becoming a country with both wealth and power than any time in history. In some way, China is already playing the role of a global power without fully becoming one yet.

The clearest indication of China's great power ambition could be found in 2017. In January President Xi went to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, and told the assembled throng that China supports free trade, projecting an image of China as a force for global stability, an engine for global growth, and a champion of globalization. On 17 February 2017 during a national security seminar in Beijing, Xi suggested that China should "guide" the international community in constructing a new world order that is more just and fairer and jointly safeguarding international security. Soon afterwards Prime Minister Li Keqiang gave his annual work report at the National People's Congress in March. The report included an unusually long passage about foreign policy and mentioned *quanqiu* (global) or *quanqiuhua* (globalisation) 13 times. That compares with only five such mentions the previous year⁸. China under Xi Jinping has apparently departed from *Tao Guang Yang Hui* and aims to play a leadership role in international affairs.

Also in January 2017, a Chinese freight train left Yiwu in East China's Zhejiang province, passed through Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany, Belgium and France over the course of its 18-day trip before entering the UK. The nearly 8,000-mile Yiwu-London route forms part of China's OBOR initiative. The Yiwu-London freight service marks another milestone for an altogether more ambitious plan: the revival of the centuries-old Silk Road trade routes between China and the West.

China's great power ambition has been driven by both domestic imperatives and international environment. After over three decades of rapid growth, the Chinese economy began to transform itself from being manufacturing and export-oriented to innovation and consumption-based in the early 2010s. China has already invested enormously in much part of the developing world since the early 1990s. With the economic transformation under way in the 2010s, China began to invest in the developed West, seeking new technologies and overseas commercial brands through mergers and acquisitions. This is a major strategy to upgrade its economy, especially its inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs). As Chinese economic growth slows down, demands for raw materials and energy from developing countries have also declined. Meanwhile, the rising middle class has become more cosmopolitan and more conscious of China's global status. In response, the Chinese government focuses more on development quality than the GDP growth rate now. To be more actively involved in international affairs has become a natural policy choice.

While continuing to invest heavily in infrastructure and other development projects in the developing world, China has accelerated its investment in the West since the mid-2000s. Relatively unscathed by the 2008 global financial crisis, China was able to come to the rescue of Western economies such as Greece and Italy. By 2015, China had become a net investor in international business. The United States, Canada, Australia, Germany and Britain have become some of the top destinations of Chinese outbound investment. Indeed, external expectations are high for China to play a bigger international role: from Sudan to North Korea, from the Middle East

⁸ URL: <https://www.economist.com/news/china/21719828-xi-jinping-talks-china-solution-without-specifying-what-means-china-challenging>.

to Europe, the solution to thorny international security and economic problems is becoming increasingly more difficult without the active participation of China.

As China's power continues to grow and its global influence expands, the Chinese public feels increasingly confident about their country's global status. According to a Pew survey in October 2016, 75 percent of the Chinese believed that their nation plays a more important role on the world stage today than it did a decade ago; only 23 percent Europeans and 21 percent Americans viewed their countries so confidently⁹.

Initiated and led by China, the AIIB was established in 2015, with 57 founding members from Asia and other regions, and by mid-2017, the membership had reached 77. The United States and Japan are the only major economies that are not members yet as of this writing, although neither has ruled out the possibility of joining it later. Their initial reluctance was largely due to their ambiguity on how to deal with a rising China. For example, the Japanese government sees the AIIB as a rivalry to the ADB that it has led since its inception in 1967 and is unwilling to throw its support behind the AIIB.

Perhaps no project better reveals China's grand ambition than the OBOR or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), considered to be China's solution to global economic blues and part of Xi Jinping's Chinese Dream – rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. During his visits to Central Asia and Southeast Asia in September and October 2013 respectively, Xi raised the idea of jointly building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road. Since then the BRI has become “the organizing foreign policy concept” of the Xi era [Rolland 2017, 38]. As the official *Xinhua* news agency claimed, this is a once in a lifetime crack at modern prosperity for developing nations with infrastructure deficits. By mid-2017 the OBOR project had covered over 70 countries, with over \$1 trillion worth of projects already in the pipeline. The Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in May 2017 attracted representatives from 100 odd countries, including 29 heads of states, leaders of the United Nations, World Bank and the IMF, and thousands of government officials, entrepreneurs, business leaders, journalists, and scholars.

In many ways OBOR is an economic plan designed to open up and create new markets for Chinese goods and technology and to help export excess industrial capacity by shifting factories overseas to less developed countries. It also has geopolitical impact giving China greater leverage in countries receiving China's investment. While many countries embrace the OBOR as a way to promote their trade and economic ties regionally, others notably India have suspicions about China's strategic intention. Constructing such an extensive network will also have immense legal, security and logistic challenges.

Mixed Reactions

China seems set to become the first non-Western power in the modern era to shape the geopolitics of Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific. International reactions to China's rising global status have been mixed.

After President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the 12-member TPP in January 2017, many feared that the multilateral trade agreement would become a thing of the past. Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull suggested China could be a replacement and help salvage the deal¹⁰. Striking a different chord, Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop said bluntly in a policy speech in Singapore in March 2017 that China should embrace democracy to develop its full potential.

⁹ URL: <http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/10/05/chinese-public-sees-more-powerful-role-in-world-names-u-s-as-top-threat/>.

¹⁰ URL: https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2017/01/24/Australias-prime-minister-suggests-China-could-replace-US-in-TPP/1561485267612/.

“While non-democracies such as China can thrive... an essential pillar of our preferred order is democratic community”. She added, “History also shows democracy and democratic institutions are essential for nations if they are to reach their economic potential”¹¹. The mixed feelings of Australian leaders about the future role of China are quite telling. Western concerns about China’s reemergence boil down to a fundamental question: Is China friend or foe? Or will China be like us?

Overall, developing countries generally have a more benign view of China’s rise than developed countries. China’s global presence and influence are rather strong and are likely to continue to grow. For example, findings from Afrobarometer’s 2014/2015 surveys in 36 African countries suggest that on average, 63 percent of Africans surveyed believed China to be a “somewhat” or “very positive” influence in their countries while only 15 percent see it as “somewhat/very negative”¹².

The West has long criticized China for being a free-rider in the international system, but when China is assuming more responsibilities through the AIIB and OBOR, some in the West feel uneasy. When commenting on why the United States and its allies and partners must push forward the TPP that excluded China, then US President Barack Obama said: “The United States, not countries like China, should write (global trade rules)”¹³. Such knee-jerk reactions suggest that the West may not be ready to accept China as a great power yet. Interestingly, China has abandoned such zero-sum way of thinking. In its BRI and other policy proposals, China has consistently emphasized inclusiveness, common development, and win-win results. It is encouraging that the US government expressed interest in participating in BRI during the May 2017 Belt and Road Forum in Beijing.

Elizabeth Economy, a senior scholar at the Council on Foreign Relations, cast a doubt on China being a global leader and asked a piercing question: what is the China model today¹⁴? She noted that when considering China as a global leader, it is worth a quick look at the China model. Yes, it is an extraordinary achievement to have lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. But with the range of environmental, public health, and other social challenges China now confronts as a result of its development model, is it a model worth emulating? Can the world afford a global leader that does not speak out on human rights abuses elsewhere and has a long and storied record of failing to acknowledge and address its own [Economy 2017]? Indeed, China’s soft power deficiency and lack of cultural appeal are formidable obstacles on its path to becoming a truly global leader.

China’s growing power has significant impact on its foreign relations. The Philippines is a case in point. President Benigno Aquino III took the long-standing dispute against Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea to an international arbitration court in The Hague. The court ruled in the Philippines’ favor in July 2016. Rodrigo Duterte, who succeeded Aquino just before the ruling, has taken an unusually conciliatory approach to China, willing to sideline sovereignty claims in return for lucrative economic relations with China.

¹¹ URL: <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-03-14/julie-bishop-warns-china-on-need-to-embrace-democracy/8350968>.

¹² URL: http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno122_perceptions_of_china_in_africa1.pdf.

¹³ URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-obama-the-tpp-would-let-america-not-china-lead-the-way-on-global-trade/2016/05/02/680540e4-0fd0-11e6-93ae-50921721165d_story.html?utm_term=.0b888ccf9c7f.

¹⁴ URL: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-01-22/beijing-no-champion-globalization>.

Challenges

While many countries welcome opportunities associated with China's expanding economic power, some countries in the West and several of China's Asian neighbors tend to view China's rise with suspicion. In the near future, the United States is unlikely to yield its dominant position to anybody else in the international system. It welcomes China's peaceful development, but it will resist perceived China's efforts to change the rules of the game that were set by the West. China's neighbors particularly Japan and India will remain vigilant as China's power continues to expand. Japan has, until recently, the largest economy in Asia and is unwilling to play second fiddle to China. India considers itself as an equal to China and tends to exaggerate China's intentions to dominate the Indo-Pacific region. Some countries will also challenge China's development model or its lack of universal values as it assumes more global leadership responsibilities. How to promote projects like BRI and engage other major economies to garner support for its global endeavors will be a major foreign policy challenge for China.

On the other hand, China must refrain from punching above its weight. Essentially China is still a large developing nation that needs to narrow the gap with the developed West. While its aggregate economy is huge and will catch up with the US very soon, its per capita income is remarkably low, at about one-fifth of the US level. It's admirable for China to be willing to share more burdens in international affairs, but fundamentally China's focus must be on domestic development. China is interested and is expected to play a bigger role in international affairs, but whether China should is another question. Already some scholars in China have expressed concerns about China's strategic over-extension or "strategic overdraft" [Shi 2016, 203].

China's great power ambition will also be constrained by its ability to handle crises in East Asia. On Korean Peninsula, a defiant Kim Jong-un regime has no intention of giving up its nuclear program and puts China in a strategic dilemma. China's disputes with Japan run deep and expose the fundamental problems between the rivaling neighbors. Most significantly, a democratic Taiwan is increasingly uninterested in being part of a unified China. In the words of the CCP itself, China's great rejuvenation will not be realized until the nation achieves complete unification.

Though China generally enjoys very favorable views in the developing world, it has not been very successful in projecting a benign image in the developed world. Chinese official media outlets such as China Central TV and Xinhua have spent billions of dollars to spruce up their programs overseas, but they have yet to become a reliable source of information for many Westerners. Efforts to promote Chinese language and culture through establishment of Confucius Institutes have also encountered various problems, particularly criticisms that the Confucius Institutes have intervened in academic freedom at several North American institutions.

China's growing clout has worried some in the West. Dalian Wanda's purchase of Legendary caused some concerns about influence of official Chinese culture in the United States. Recent revelation by Richard Gere, long-time critic of Chinese human rights and strong supporter for free Tibet, that he has been blacklisted by China and shunned by Hollywood movies targeted for the lucrative Chinese market may highlight the cultural divide between China and the United States and add to American's anxieties about growing Chinese influence¹⁵.

¹⁵ URL: <https://www.smh.com.au/entertainment/movies/richard-gere-says-hes-been-blacklisted-in-hollywood-because-of-free-tibet-views-20170420-gvo9ma.html>.

Conclusions

Napoleon Bonaparte remarked in 1807: “Let China sleep, for when it wakes, it will shake the world”. China is awake now and is fundamentally shaping the future of the world. The outside world will continue to ask questions about China’s rise: Is China creating a new world order or is it simply modifying or enhancing the existing order? How will China contribute to international peace and development as a responsible power?

Through its various policy initiatives, China is making solid global strides even as the United States enters a phase of incoherence under President Donald Trump. As a South Asia scholar remarked, ‘China is steadily acquiring the status of being the other “indispensable nation”, a term used by former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to describe the US¹⁶.

There are some simple yardsticks by which to judge whether China has risen to be a global power: Is China a major destination of international students and tourists? Has *Renminbi* become a major reserve currency? Is Chinese a major language in the world now? Does China have globally accepted and admired brand names? While China is considered by many as a global power already, it is also clear that it remains a large developing nation, with many daunting challenges at home such as a growing income gap, worsening environment, and rampant corruption. For a long time to come, China will need to focus on domestic development. Most significantly, China lacks soft power, without which, China will remain a half-baked power, or what David Shambaugh calls “partial power” [Shambaugh 2014, 57].

In social sciences, socialization refers to the lifelong process of learning, inheriting and disseminating norms, customs, values and ideologies, providing an individual with the skills and habits necessary for participating within their own society. Socialization represents the process of learning throughout the course of one’s life and is a central influence on the behavior, beliefs, and actions of adults as well as of children.

It’s not hard to see why China is sometimes the object of suspicion. Other countries will increasingly have to balance their national security concerns with their economic and commercial ties with China. For China, following international norms in foreign policy and launching public relations campaigns may help erase some of the concerns about its rise. China must also balance its domestic development and global commitment. In the final analysis, both China and the West need to become accustomed to the growing power of China and its challenges through mutual socialization.

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¹⁶ URL: <https://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/just-graffiti/chinas-whispers-it-continues-to-make-steady-global-strides-even-as-us-enters-a-phase-of-incoherence/>.

ВЕЛИКОДЕРЖАВНІ АМБІЦІЇ КИТАЮ: ОЧІКУВАННЯ, МОЖЛИВОСТІ Й ВИКЛИКИ

Ли Цзе

У свій перший робочий день на посаді Президента Сполучених Штатів Америки Дональд Трамп підписав наказ про вихід США з Транстихоокеанського партнерства (ТТП). Багато аналітиків стверджує, що такий крок стане коштовною можливістю для Китаю заповнити цю нішу як світового лідера. У Китаї та поза його межами є очікування, що його сила, яка зростає, відіграватиме більшу роль у міжнародних відносинах.

Дійсно, у дуже короткі терміни Китай набув багатьох зовнішніх атрибутів світової держави. Зовнішня політика Китаю стала активнішою та наполегливішою з початку століття, особливо після того, як Сі Цзінпін став верховним керівником Китаю у 2012 році. Основні зусилля Китаю з демонстрування статусу великої держави в останні роки включають створення Азіатського банку інфраструктурних інвестицій (АБІ) у 2015 році та запуск ініціативи «Один пояс, один шлях» (ОПОШ). Будучи впродовж десятиліть значним отримувачем прямих іноземних інвестицій (ПІІ), Китай став великим світовим інвестором і у 2015 обсяг його вихідних інвестицій перевищив обсяг вхідних. У 2016 році він створив свою першу військову базу матеріально-технічного забезпечення в Джибуті, за якою, найбільш імовірно, з'являться наступні. З кожною великою зовнішньополітичною ініціативою Китай наближається до втілення своєї мрії про велику потугу.

Виходячи з інтерв'ю з ученими та чиновниками, а також з аналізу оригінальних документів та опублікованих праць, у статті розглядаємо внутрішні й зовнішні дискусії про дійсну роль Китаю в сучасному світі. Тоді як багато хто стверджує, що Китай має продовжувати вичікувати в рамках стратегії «таогуан янхуей», прихильники посилення глобальної ролі Китаю стають усе активнішими. Чого саме бажає Китай? Які проблеми та перепони на його шляху до великодержавних амбіцій? Як мінлива зовнішня політика Китаю вплине на нього самого, а також на світову політичну економіку? Це політично-орієнтоване дослідження вказує важливі наслідки для Китаю, інших великих держав і міжнародного суспільства загалом.

Ключові слова: китайська мрія, «Один пояс, один шлях», «таогуан янхуей», «юсо цзovej», великодержавні амбіції, зовнішня політика, глобалізація, міжнародні відносини.

ВЕЛИКОДЕРЖАВНЫЕ АМБИЦИИ КИТАЯ: ОЖИДАНИЯ, ВОЗМОЖНОСТИ И ВЫЗОВЫ

Ли Цзе

В свой первый рабочий день на должности Президента Соединенных Штатов Америки Дональд Трамп подписал приказ о выходе США из Транстихоокеанского партнерства (ТТП), многие аналитики утверждают, что такой ход станет бесценной возможностью для Китая заполнить эту нишу в качестве мирового лидера. В Китае и вне его границ есть ожидания, что его усиливающаяся власть станет играть большую роль в международных отношениях.

Действительно, в очень короткие сроки Китай приобрел много внешних атрибутов мировой державы. Внешняя политика Китая стала более активной и напористой с начала столетия, особенно после того, как Си Цзиньпин стал верховным руководителем Китая в 2012 году. Основные усилия по проецированию статуса великой державы Китая в последние годы включают создание Азиатского банка инфраструктурных инвестиций (АБИИ) в 2015 году и запуск программы «Один пояс, один путь» в 2013 году. Будучи крупным получателем прямых иностранных инвестиций (ПИИ) на протяжении десятилетий, Китай стал крупным глобальным инвестором, и в 2015 году объем исходящих инвестиций впервые превысил входящие. В 2016 году он создал свою первую военную базу материально-технического снабжения в Джибути, за которой, скорее всего, последуют другие. С каждой крупной внешнеполитической инициативой Китай приближается к реализации своей мечты о великой державе.

Основываясь на интервью с учеными и официальными лицами, а также на анализе оригинальных документов и опубликованных работ, статье рассмотрим внутренние и внешние дискуссии о надлежащей роли Китая в современном мире. В то время как многие утверждают, что Китай должен по-прежнему выжидать в рамках стратегии «таогуан янхуэй», сторонники усиления глобальной роли Китая становятся все более активными. Чего именно хочет Китай? Каковы проблемы и препятствия на пути к его великодержавным амбициям? Как меняющаяся внешняя политика Китая повлияет на него самого, а также на глобальную политическую экономику? Это политически ориентированное исследование будет иметь важные последствия для Китая, других крупных держав и международного сообщества в целом.

Ключевые слова: китайская мечта, «Один пояс, один путь», «таогуан янхуэй», «юсо цзовэй», великодержавные амбиции, внешняя политика, глобализация, международные отношения.

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